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Executive Summary
A Primer on Governance of the Family
Enterprise is written both for families and for
practitioners associated with or interested
in family enterprises. By combining a
rigorous review of existing studies with a
practical perspective, the report seeks to
identify best practices in family enterprise
governance. Specifically, the two major
questions are:
−− How is the family enterprise governed?
−− How does governance impact
performance of the family enterprise?
The family enterprise includes family
members; one or more family-owned,
-managed and/or -controlled businesses
(which may be private or public); often a
philanthropic entity such as a foundation;
and a family office. The governance system
of the family enterprise is an integrated,
interdependent and coherent architecture
composed of the specific governance
structure of each of its entities.
Family governance refers to the
rules, processes and institutions that
enable family decision-making and the
management of family affairs. The family is
often characterized by multiple generations
and multiple family branches, which
over time present great challenges to
maintaining family cohesion and norms. A
customized governance system, tailored to
the context of the specific family, can help
ensure the sustainability and prosperity of
the family business, enable family harmony
and happiness, manage succession of
ownership and control, and mitigate family
conflict. The family governance system
rests on the family’s shared beliefs and
values. Formal elements often include family
constitution, family council, family assembly
and family committees. It is important to
design an adaptable governance structure
where decision-making is perceived to be
fair.
This report discusses six major
components of family firm governance:
ownership structure, control mechanisms,
board of directors, executive compensation,
dividend policy and succession. The
objective of corporate governance is to
enable investors (owners) to obtain an
appropriate return on their investment in
the firm. Widely-held public corporations
face the so-called “agency problem” –
managers and investors may have different
and conflicting incentives. While family
firms can typically align management and
ownership incentives, they are more likely
to face another agency problem – the
potential conflict of interest between family
and non-family shareholders. Attention to
this issue is an important consideration in
all aspects of governance of the family firm
(and enterprise).
4
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Substantial families with investable assets
in excess of US$ 100 million often choose
to set up their own family office – a
professional organization dedicated to
serving the financial and personal needs of
the family. Recent studies have identified
several best practices of family offices,
including effective internal controls to
reduce sources of risk for the family, inhouse handling of key activities, extensive
and frequent communication with family
members, education programmes for
younger generations and succession
planning.
The family foundation – typically a private
philanthropic foundation supported by
the family, the family business and its
investment income – can be beneficial to
the family for reasons beyond tax reduction
and reputation. Three positive effects
on family dynamics include provision
of opportunities for financial education
and cross-generational mentoring to
family members, enhancement of family
interaction and communication, and
enlargement of the sphere of discussion
in the family. This report describes the
different family foundation structures,
the potential advantages of hiring a nonfamily administrator and the need for
family foundations to choose between
diversification and concentration in their
grant-making strategy.
Finally, the report explores in detail
the relation between family enterprise
governance and economic performance.
The key findings are:
− The use of family governance practices
enhances the financial success of the
firm.
−− The relation between family ownership
and performance is similar to an
inverse-U-curve: at first, it increases
as family ownership increases, but
decreases after a point. However, this
positive relation is conditional on the
family firm being transparent.
−− The use of a “wedge” between voting
rights and cash-flow rights (whereby
the family hold voting or control rights
beyond their ownership rights) adversely
affects performance. This reinforces the
advice that family firms should carefully
consider which mechanisms to use to
control their firms as their effects on
performance differ.
−− Family firms generally prefer to have the
heir manage the family business rather
than an outsider.

This report concludes with a discussion
of the main findings and an extensive
bibliography. The clear message that
emerges from this review is the important
role that a well-defined governance
structure plays in the prosperity and
longevity of the family enterprise. A codified
family enterprise governance system
contributes to enhancing family harmony
and happiness, as well as family wealth.

1. Introduction
This report offers an up-to-date critical
assessment of the received academic and
professional literature on governance of
the family enterprise. The family enterprise
includes family members; one or more
family-owned, -managed and -controlled
businesses (which may be private or
public); often a philanthropic entity such
as a foundation; and a family office.
The report’s aim is to identify the best
practices in family enterprise governance.
Specifically, it attempts to answer two
major questions:
−− How is the family enterprise governed?
−− How does governance impact
performance of the family enterprise?

1.1 Background on Corporate
Governance
The concept of governance is prevalent in a
broad range of settings. In the context of a
widely-held public company, the separation
between shareholders and management
lies at the core of the governance
problem.1 Such separation leads to a socalled “agency problem”.2 Managers are
shareholders’ agents and have control of
day-to-day decision-making in the firm.
However, separation between those who
finance a firm and those who manage it
may create conflicts of incentive between
the two parties. When managers’ interests
and shareholders’ interests are not aligned,
managers may choose actions that benefit
them and adversely affect shareholders’
returns on their invested capital. In this
context, corporate governance is the
mechanism created to minimize the risk
of such a situation arising. In other words,
the objective of corporate governance is to
enable investors to obtain an appropriate
return on their investment in the firm.3
In corporations that have one or more
very large shareholders and many small
shareholders, a conflict of incentive
between these two types of shareholders
may also arise as the large shareholders
may navigate the firm in a way that benefits
them and adversely affects the smaller
shareholders.4 In this context, “corporate
governance structures serve to ensure
that minority shareholders receive reliable
information about the value of the firm
and that a company’s managers and large
shareholders do not cheat them out of the
value of their investment.”5
Hence, the governance of a firm needs
to be designed so as to alleviate these
incentive issues and induce investors to
provide financing to firms while minimizing
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the risk of misappropriation of their capital.
With this in mind, governance can be
defined as “the set of mechanisms that
influence the decisions made by managers
when there is a separation of ownership
and control.”6 An alternative definition could
be “the set of contracts that help align the
actions of managers with the interests of
shareholders.”7
Scholars have addressed a range of major
corporate governance issues, including
concentration of control in the hands of
one shareholder,8 hostile takeovers,9 proxy
voting contests,10 control by the board of
directors,11 and executive compensation
schemes aligning managerial interests with
shareholder interests.12
The provision of transparent information to
shareholders is critical to the effectiveness
of the governance structure. Scholars
have suggested that “limited corporate
transparency increases demand on
corporate governance systems to alleviate
moral hazard problems resulting from a
more severe information gap between
managers and shareholders.”13 In fact,
a large body of research has found
that financial reporting mitigates these
information asymmetries,14 thereby
significantly alleviating the agency conflict.
Management scholars have built on the
agency theory perspective on corporate
governance to include such theories as
resource dependence theory, stewardship
theory and power theory.15 Resource
dependence theory suggests that the
board of directors, in addition to being a
monitoring body, is an important catalyst
of resources such as access to finance,
legal advice and social capital. Stewardship
theory broadens the perspective on
the motivations driving managerial
behaviour to highlight both the self-interest
motivation of managers and their role as
stewards of corporate resources, which
is consistent with shareholders’ interests.
The power perspective offers insights on
the interaction between management
and governance bodies. This thesis
suggests that managers, while being legally
subordinate to directors, may acquire
extra power in certain situations, thereby
having the opportunity to circumvent the
monitoring function of the board.

The objective of corporate
governance is to enable
investors to obtain an
appropriate return on their
investment in the firm.
Governance mechanisms can be both
internal and external.16 Among the internal
mechanisms, the main examples are board
of directors, executive compensation
contracts and concentration of control. The
main external mechanism for corporate
control is the market. Furthermore,
management scholars have also addressed
the governance roles of organizational
culture and norms, which serve as a
powerful social control mechanism driving
behaviour and contributing to organizational
cohesion and alignment of incentives.17
By exercising substantial control on
business and through their participation in
management, family firms often manage
to align the incentives between ownership
and management. This has the effect of
alleviating the classic owner-manager
conflict that characterizes widely-held,
publicly-traded corporations and on which
much of the so-called “agency” literature
has centred. However, family firms are
more likely to be faced with another
agency problem: the potential conflict of
interest between family and non-family
shareholders. Specifically, the controlling
family may force managerial decisions
that are in the best interest of family
shareholders but may not be in the interest
of all shareholders, thereby gaining private
benefits at the expense of non-family
shareholders. This is a widely prevalent
phenomenon, and any discussion of
governance in the context of the family firm
must address this issue.

1.2 The Family Enterprise

Figure 1: Family Enterprise Key Components

The various parts of the family enterprise
include the family members, one or more
family-owned, -managed and -controlled
businesses (which may be private or
public), often a philanthropic entity such as
a family foundation, and a family office.
Figure 1 depicts the key components of the
family enterprise. The following definitions
have been used for these entities:
−− Family: A group of individuals related by
blood, marriage or adoption, who have
a claim on the family business or other
common family assets. Family members
may belong to multiple generations and
may be part of multiple family branches.
It is important to highlight that the family
is not an investment group, meaning
that people do not choose to be a part
of it. This is the fundamental source of
many of the distinctive features of the
family enterprise that shall be discussed
below.
−− Family Firm: A firm characterized by a
substantial presence of the founding
family. Whenever the founding family
exercises significant influence through
its equity ownership, voting control and/
or management, this report considers
such a firm as a family firm. According
to this definition, a family firm can be
private or public; it may be led by the
founder, by a later-generation family
member or by professionals that are
not members of the family. However, it
should be noted that the literature has
used a variety of different definitions.
These can be divided into two groups:
structural definitions (based on
structural characteristics of the firm) and
process definitions (based on the role of
the family in the business).19
−− Family Office: The professional
organization, owned and controlled by
the family, created to serve the wealthmanagement and personal needs of
family members.

Family Enterprise

Family
Office
Family
Firm

Family

Family
Foundation

Figure 2: The Three-Circle Model
Source: Tagiuri and Davis, 1996

Family Owners

Family
Owner-Employees

Business

The family firm is the primary source
of the family’s wealth. The literature
has highlighted a set of characteristics
differentiating the family firm from its nonfamily counterpart:
−− Family firms have a preference for
control, while non-family firms have a
preference for cash-flows.

−− Family Foundation: The organization
through which the family carries out its
philanthropic activities.

−− Family firms have a long investment
horizon, while non-family firms have a
short investment horizon.

The interconnections between family
members and the family business can
be depicted by the three-circle model
illustrated in Figure 2.

−− Family firms are characterized by
conflict of interest between family
blockholders and minority shareholders,
while non-family firms are characterized
by conflict of interest between
management and shareholders.
−− Family firms face trade-offs between
control, liquidity and growth, while nonfamily, widely-held firms do not face a
significant degree of such trade-offs.
−− Family firms typically focus on
investment projects with long payback
periods, while non-family firms often
focus on cutting costs to maximize
short-term profits.
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1.3 Governance of the Family
Enterprise
Family enterprise governance refers to the
collection of mechanisms that enable family
decision-making and implementation of
policies concerning the management of
family affairs, its businesses and related
entities, such as its foundation and family
office, in a manner that meets the mission
and goals of the family. These mechanisms
include formal structures, processes, rules
and agreements, as well as informally
shared family values, culture, beliefs and
norms.
The governance system of the family
enterprise is an integrated, interdependent
and coherent architecture composed of the
specific governance structure of each of the
entities of the family enterprise, including:
−− Governance of the family
−− Governance of the family firm
−− Governance of other family entities
such as the family office and family
foundation
Each of these specific governance systems
is focused on in subsequent sections.

1.4 Why Family Enterprises
Matter
The study of family enterprises is important
mainly because family enterprises are
prevalent in most economies worldwide.
Despite this prevalence, the mainstream
literature in business and economics has
traditionally considered the widely-held
corporation as the predominant paradigm
of a firm. Therefore, most research has
focused on questions relevant to that
context. Only over the past two decades
has attention been given to family firms.
Academics have traditionally held the belief
that in developed economies, at some
point all firms would pass into the final
stage of their evolution process – the public
corporation with dispersed ownership.
However, this phenomenon is far from
universal. In few economies is the public
corporation the dominant paradigm, and
even in those economies family firms
represent a large fraction of the market. In
many economies of the world, family firms
are clearly the most common type of firm.
The dominance of the widely-held
corporation has been questioned by many
contributions over the past decade. A
2009 study of a representative sample
of public companies in the United States
(US) showed that 96% had a blockholder
and these blockholders owned 39% of the
common stock in the sample.20 Moreover,
it found that the ownership concentration
level of US firms was similar to other
countries in the world when taking firm size
into account.
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In fact, the prevalence of family firms has
been documented in a number of studies.
A study of the ultimate ownership of the
20 largest public companies from the 27
richest economies in the world found that
30% of the sample were family-controlled,
while 36% were widely-held and 18%
state-owned.21 Of course, this result
underestimated the importance of family
firms as the authors considered only the
largest firms and only in rich countries.
Among the countries with higher family
ownership among their 20 largest firms
were Mexico (100%), Hong Kong (70%)
and Argentina (65%).
A 2006 study of the 508 US-listed firms
that have ranked among the Fortune 500
between 1994 and 2000 found that 37%
in the overall sample were family firms,
a percentage that increased in specific
industries such as personal services
(67%), motion pictures (77%) and health
services (56%).22 An analysis of ownership
in 13 Western European countries found
that 44% of firms were family-controlled;
this percentage was above 50% in most
countries in Continental Europe.23
This trend holds in East Asia too: a
study of ownership in nine East Asian
countries found that the top 15 families
controlled very large fractions of the market
capitalization in most countries, including
Indonesia (62%), the Philippines (55%)
and Thailand (53%). The top 15 families
controlled even larger fractions of the GDP
in certain countries, such as Hong Kong
(84%), Malaysia (76%) and Singapore
(48%).24

1.5 Methodology
The objective of this report is to capture
the key findings that the literature on family
enterprise governance has offered, and
translate them into best practices.
The methodology consists of critically
reviewing the received academic and
professional literature on problems related
to the governance of the family enterprise.
More specifically, the procedure has
involved:
−− Reviewing and selecting a subset of the
received literature based on a rigorous
quality criterion
−− Using an interdisciplinary approach
which draws from the fields of
Management, Finance, Accounting,
Psychology, Sociology and Economics
−− Combining the academic and
professional literature, in order to have
rigorous treatment along with practical
perspective
−− Considering the contributions of studies
that use qualitative, analytical and
empirical approaches

This report will be useful primarily to families
and, more generally, to practitioners whose
work relates to family enterprises.

2. Governance of the Family
The family is often characterized by multiple
generations and multiple family branches.
As time passes and more generations
are added, there is less interaction
among family members, a decline in
common experiences and decreasing
similarity. Unless steps are taken to
hold family members together, they will
tend to grow apart, thereby making the
preservation of family norms, culture and
legacy challenging. The multi-generation,
multi-branch family often has multiple
objectives, including: ensuring sustainability
and prosperity of the family business;
enabling family harmony and happiness
among future generations; sustaining the
family brand; maintaining control of the
family business; managing succession
of ownership, control and management;
and mitigating family conflicts to maintain
unity. To allow the family to realize these
objectives, a customized family governance
system, developed by the family and
tailored to the context of the family, is
needed.

Family governance
refers to the rules,
processes and
institutions that enable
the decision-making and
implementation of policies
concerning the oversight
and management of
family affairs.
2.1 Foundations of Family
Governance Systems
The family governance system needs to be
crafted so as to:
−− Enable coordinated decision-making
about common assets and their
management
−− Enable orderly succession in ownership,
management and control
−− Minimize interpersonal conflict within
the family
−− Enable family harmony and happiness in
future generations
−− Preserve and enhance family wealth
−− Ensure sustainability and prosperity of
the family business
−− Enable long-term estate planning

10
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The family governance system includes
intra-group and inter-group elements. Intragroup elements refer to the governance of
relationships and decision-making within
the family. Inter-group elements refer to
the relation between the family and the
other family enterprise entities such as the
family business, the family office and the
family foundation. Figure 3 illustrates the
foundations of a family governance system.
Figure 3: The Family Governance System

2.2 Informal Elements
As depicted in Figure 3, the base of a
robust family governance system rests
on intangible elements that belong to the
sphere of family culture. Family culture can
be seen as the system of shared values and
norms that define appropriate attitudes and
behaviours for family members.25 Values are
concepts and beliefs that guide selection
and evaluation of actions and events.26
These shared values and norms may be
related to different spheres: ethics, religion,
environment, politics, justice and so on.

Recent research suggests that an important
informal element of family governance is
the “fairness perception” among family
members.27 As per the fairness hypothesis,
the fairness perceived by family members is
both the main driver of happiness and the
main deterrent of conflict, in that the degree
to which family decisions are perceived to
be fair shapes the individuals’ judgements
and thus determines their behaviour. More
specifically, individual fairness perception
leads to higher satisfaction with family
decisions and stronger identification with
the family, and a fairness perception climate
decreases family conflict, as illustrated in
Figure 4.

Figure 4: How Perceptions of Fairness Impact Family Dynamics

Therefore, families should build their
institutions with the objective of promoting
a sense of fairness. This can be done if one
keeps in mind that fairness is fundamentally
related to the idea of justice. Justice is
thought of as taking three forms: distributive
(fairness of outcomes), procedural (fairness
of decision-making processes) and
interactional (fairness of treatments). When
family governance shows these three forms
of justice, family members have a higher
fairness perception, ultimately being more
satisfied and less prone to conflict.

satisfaction and job satisfaction. Moreover,
commitment to the family enterprise and
job satisfaction are negatively related to
the propensity to leave. Interestingly, this
research suggests that family cohesion
does not have a significant effect on
the attitude of second-generation family
members. This in turn suggests that,
regardless of family cohesion, designing
an adaptable governance structure is
important for the longevity of the family
enterprise.

Beyond its benefits to family relationships,
fairness has a positive effect on the family
business, as suggested by a study centred
on the impact of procedural justice on the
family business.28 Defining a fair process
as a construct that includes both a clear
description of the steps and a precise
characterization of each step, it outlines the
following steps that a process has to go
through to be seen as fair:
1. Engaging with and framing the issue
2. Exploring and selecting the options
3. Deciding and explaining the reasons
underlying the choice
4. Implementing and executing the chosen
option
5. Evaluating the outcome and learning
from it

2.3 Formal Elements

Moreover, each step should be
characterized by five qualities:
communication, clarification, consistency,
changeability and commitment to fairness.
Drawing from case studies, the study
discusses how the implementation of fair
processes has a positive impact on the
family firm. Fair process generates better
solutions and the perception of positive
results leads individuals to demand
more fair process, activating a positively
reinforcing cycle. On the other hand, the
absence of fair process may prompt forms
of redistributive justice, where individuals
react to the perceived lack of fairness.

The formal elements of a multi-generational,
multi-branch family ordinarily include:
– Family Constitution: A morally binding
document, it contains rules and
regulations about coordinating decisionmaking among family members. It
generally contains information about
the family mission, code of conduct,
history, values, beliefs and norms, as
well as the family’s mechanisms for
conflict management and succession,
its institutions including business
institutions, and its employment,
liquidity and exit policies.
− Family Council: A forum of certain family
members elected or appointed by the
family, it is responsible for coordinating
family decision-making and managing
family affairs.
– Family Assembly: A forum of all family
members dedicated to preserving
the family’s heritage, culture, norms
and traditions, it also discusses family
affairs.
– Family Committees: Groups of elected
or appointed family members, they
are responsible for specific aspects of
family life, such as education of family
members and family philanthropy.

Family governance mechanisms may have
an enduring effect on family members.
Specifically, their characteristics affect
the mindset and behaviour of the next
generation of the family. The effect of two
qualities of the family governance structure
– family cohesion and family adaptability
– on the attitude of the second generation
forms the subject of a 2006 study of
Chinese family firms.29 Family cohesion
is defined as the degree of emotional
closeness among family members, while
family adaptability is defined as the degree
to which the family is able to change its
structure following situations of stress.30

The above governance structure emerges
over time as the family grows beyond
the first generation. The development of
the formal governance structure is often
visible in the second or third generation.
Yet, the specific institutions depend on
whether the family continues to own,
control or manage in later generations the
business or businesses founded by the
first generation. In instances where the
business is sold and family members share
interests in common financial assets, a
single family office, which includes a private
asset-management organization, may be
developed. The specific structure of the
investment vehicles depends on a broad
range of factors including estate plans and
tax considerations.

Based on survey data from 88 Chinese
family firms, the study finds that family
adaptability has strong effects on secondgeneration members. Particularly, family
adaptability is very positively related to
commitment to the family enterprise, life

Broader environmental factors and
societal trends also affect the evolution
of family governance. Since the 1970s,
families in Western societies have been
changing, following two main patterns:
increased individualism and increased

democratization.31 An analysis of the
evolution of family governance among 50
Australian family firms finds that these two
trends threaten the stability and continuity
of the family. Families have been attempting
to counter these trends by developing
governance policies such as a family
code of conduct, along with governance
institutions and traditions that facilitate
communication and negotiation, including
family councils, family assemblies, family
meetings and family retreats.
Finally, the family governance structure is
likely to have an impact on the family firm
governance.32 Survey data from 192 family
firms in Finland shows that the variety of
family institutions is positively related to the
degree of social interaction among family
members, defined as the intensity of social
ties among family members. Moreover,
social interaction increases shared vision,
and shared vision improves decisionmaking in the family firm. Therefore,
ultimately, the implementation of family
governance institutions has a positive effect
on the decision-making process in the
family firm.

2.4 Conflict Management
Conflict among family members can
be highly detrimental to both the family
and the family firm. Therefore, the family
governance structure should be designed
with the aim to minimize family conflict.
The first question to ask is where family
conflict comes from. Family conflict can be
divided into two categories: family conflict
concerning business and family conflict
concerning personal relationships.33 Based
on survey data, family conflict is positively
related to three main variables:
− Lack of clarity of business leadership
− Lack of procedural justice
− Resource distribution based on need or
equity criteria, rather than on equality
criteria
As expected, beyond threatening the
happiness of the family, conflict can spill
over into the family business. In particular,
family conflict affects the family firm’s
management team, causing anxiety, a
stalemate in decision-making, lower levels
of risk-taking, less information-sharing and
reduced commitment.
Family conflict depends on the traits and
characteristics of the family.34 Research
suggests that family conflict increases
down the generations. The presence of the
founder in the business after having formally
left control – the so-called “generation
shadow” – significantly increases family
conflict.35 There is evidence that greater
family involvement in the business increases
task conflict – the disagreement among
family members over business affairs.36
A Primer on Governance of the Family Enterprise
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Particularly, a higher number of family
members involved in the daily business
operations increases the frequency of
conflict. Moreover, the degree of social
interaction among family members
increases the extent of conflict. These
two results hold independently of which
generation the family is currently at.
A study on the specific strategies used by
families to manage conflict identifies five
conflict management strategies:37
− Competition (high concern for self, low
concern for others)
− Collaboration (high concern for self,
high concern for others)
− Compromise (moderate concern for
self, moderate concern for others)
− Accommodation (low concern for self,
high concern for others)
− Avoidance (low concern for self, low
concern for others)
Competition involves strategically using
information to manipulate others in
order to reach the goal. Collaboration
involves attempting to generate solutions
satisfactory to all. Compromise involves
reaching an agreement where all parties
are moderately satisfied. Accommodation
involves recognizing and fulfilling the desires
of others. Avoidance involves refusing to
face conflicts and address problems.
The study finds evidence that the most
successful strategy for both the family and
the business is collaboration. Collaboration
is the only conflict management strategy
that seems to enhance both family
objectives and business objectives at the
same time. Conversely, the strategies
that seem to deliver the worst outcomes
for both the family and the business are
competition and avoidance. Therefore,
the study concludes that families should
attempt to use a collaborative approach
in managing conflicts. It is suggested
that collaboration can be facilitated by
the creation and enhancement of family
governance institutions that encourage
and support communication, such as
family councils, family planning and family
meetings.
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3. Governance of the
Family Firm
The standard perspective on corporate
governance is based on the longstanding
idea that the separation between ownership
and management in a widely-held public
corporation generates an agency problem
due to the potential conflict of interest
between owners and their agents, the
managers of the firm. Yet in the context
of family firms, there is another agency
problem, namely, the potential conflict of
interest between family shareholders and
non-family shareholders. In what follows,
six main aspects of family firm governance
are discussed: ownership structure, control
mechanisms, board of directors, executive
compensation, dividend policy and
succession.

Six key aspects of family
firm governance are
ownership structure,
control mechanisms,
board of directors,
executive compensation,
dividend policy and
succession.

3.1 Ownership Structure
Ownership refers to the amount of firm
equity owned by the shareholders, which
reflects the right of the shareholders to
the firm’s cash flows. The family can own
equity in two ways: directly, by owning
shares of the company with no intermediate
entity; or indirectly, by owning one or more
investment vehicles such as various types
of trusts, foundations, corporations or
partnerships.
The choice between alternative ownership
structures is guided by several factors
including estate plans, liabilities protection,
philanthropy, succession planning and
tax considerations. Typically, family firms
employ a combination of direct and indirect
forms of ownership, as shown in Figure 5.
In multi-branch, multi-generational, familycontrolled firms, the ownership structure
of the main family business may involve a
range of intermediate entities and types of
investment vehicles, as illustrated by the
example in Figure 6.

Figure 5: Example of Direct and Indirect Ownership
Source: Villalonga and Amit, 2009, Data as of 1994
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Figure 6: Example of Complex Ownership Structure
Source: Villalonga and Amit, 2009, Data as of 1996
Legend: O = ownership; V = votes

Among all US family firms in the Fortune
500 from 1994 to 2000, the founding
families owned on average 15.3% of
their firms’ equity.38 When distinguishing
between founder firms (family firms owned,
controlled or managed by the founder)
and later generation family firms (family
firms owned, controlled or managed by
second or later generation family members),
the average ownership was 14.4% and
16.1%, respectively. Direct ownership was
the most prevalent structure: 96% of the
sample firms were directly owned by their
controlling families, for at least a fraction of
the firm. However, direct ownership rarely
accounted for the total family ownership
of the firm: 80% of the family firms in the
sample showed some form of indirect
ownership. On average, 62% of the equity
was directly owned by a family with the
balance 38% owned indirectly through
some investment vehicle. The most
prevalent investment vehicles were trusts
(present in 66% of the sample firms) and
foundations (present in 37% of the sample
firms).

3.2 Control Mechanisms
Control typically refers to the way the
shareholder can influence the direction of
the firm. The literature has discerned three
main measures of control:
1. Votes owned: the number of votes at
the shareholders’ meeting associated
with the shares owned by the
shareholder.
2. Votes controlled: the number of votes at
the shareholders’ meeting controlled by
the shareholder.
3. Board seats controlled: the number
of seats in the board of directors
controlled by the shareholder.

A common characteristic of family firms is
the wedge between ownership and control;
namely, the voting control that the family
has, through one or more mechanisms,
in excess of its ownership. The difference
between ownership and control can be
computed through the framework illustrated
in Figure 7.40 It depicts the wedge between:
− Votes owned vs. shares owned
− Votes controlled vs. votes owned
− Board seats controlled vs. votes
controlled
− Board seats controlled vs. shares
owned

Figure 7: Measuring Voting Rights When They Differ from Cash Flow Rights
Source: Villalonga and Amit, 2009

The evidence of the use of indirect
ownership is confirmed in Europe. A 2007
study of the ownership structure of family
firms in Spain, based on a sample of 195
firms listed in the Spanish stock markets,
found 53.9% of all firms and 72.5% of
closely-held firms having some form of
indirect ownership.39 This confirms the use
of indirect ownership in family firms, given
that family firms represent 43.1% of all firms
and 59.2% of closely-held firms.
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The existence of the wedge between
control and ownership enables the
controlling shareholder to benefit in some
way at the expense of other shareholders.
This is commonly referred to as
appropriation of private benefits of control.
Family firms have been shown to deploy
one or more of the following controlenhancing mechanisms:
– Dual-class stock: Issuance of shares
of different classes, where one class is
associated with superior voting rights.
– Pyramidal structure: An ownership
structure whereby a focal firm owns a
fraction of another firm through a chain
of ownership relations.
– Cross-holding: An ownership structure
whereby a lower-tier company in a
pyramidal structure owns equity in its
owner, an upper-tier company in the
ownership chain.
– Voting agreement: A contractual
arrangement through which different
shareholders pool their votes to reach a
common objective.
Multiple studies have investigated what
mechanisms firms use to achieve the
wedge between ownership and control,
where control is defined as the number of
votes controlled. A study of US firms finds
that the most prevalent mechanism is dualclass stock (21% of the sample).41 Voting
agreements, pyramidal structures and
cross-holdings are either marginally relevant
or irrelevant among the sample firms of this
study. Most importantly, there is evidence
of a substantial wedge between ownership
and control. On average, family firms show
a ratio between voting rights and cash-flow
rights of 1:28.
In another study focusing on Western
Europe, a dataset comprising 5,232
corporations from 13 Western European
countries was examined.42 It found that
family firms use mostly dual-class stock
(17.61% of the sample) and pyramidal
structures (13.81%). This is different from
firms controlled by either the state or a
financial institution: in the latter, the most
frequently used mechanism was pyramidal
structure. While this study gives no
information on the wedge between control
and ownership specific to family firms,
across all firms in the sample the average
wedge was 1:15. The wedge was higher in
Switzerland (1:35), Italy (1:35) and Norway
(1:29), and lower in Spain (1:06), Portugal
(1:08) and France (1:08). However, the
concentration of family control, gauged by
measuring the average number of firms
controlled by a single family, showed that
such concentration was higher in Italy,
Norway and Sweden with, respectively,
1:46, 1:29 and 1:27 firms under control.
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Finally, a study on the same issue in East
Asia, which analysed a dataset of 2,980
firms from nine East Asian countries,
found that in the overall sample firms used
mostly pyramidal structures (38.7% of the
sample) and cross-holdings (10.1% of the
sample).43 However, it gave no information
on the most used mechanisms specifically
among family firms. There was no evidence
of use of shares with superior voting rights.
In most countries, family firms had larger
separation between ownership and control
compared with other firms. On average,
these firms achieved a positive wedge
between voting rights and cash-flow rights:
higher in Indonesia (1:46), Singapore (1:39)
and Taiwan (1:32), and lower in Japan
(1:02), Thailand (1:09) and South Korea
(1:20).
As stated, in many countries the most
prevalent mechanism to achieve control in
excess of ownership is dual-class stock.
Dual-class stock involves controlling a
firm through the trading of at least two
classes of shares, where one class has
higher voting power. An analysis of a
comprehensive dataset of US dual-class
firms during the period 1995-2002 confirms
the relevance of this control structure.44 It
finds that 6% of the firms and 8% of the
market capitalization in the sample used
dual-class shares. In this subset, 85%
had at least one traded share class that
generally had superior voting power.
The study examines what induces a firm
to engage in the use of dual-class stock.
Its hypothesis is that firms choose this
control structure if, before the initial public
offering (IPO), expected benefits (the
private benefits of control enabled by the
wedge between voting rights and cashflow rights) exceed expected costs (the
discount at which the inferior shares are
likely to trade in the future). Therefore, the
firms test the relation between the choice
of using dual-class stock and proxies of
the expectation of net benefits. Specifically,
this study finds that having the founder’s
name in the company name is a strong
predictor of choosing dual-class stock and
is particularly common among family firms.
Another important mechanism is the
pyramidal structure, which defines an
ownership structure where a firm controls
another firm not directly but through a chain
of intermediate ownership relations. The
diagram in Figure 8 provides an example.

Figure 8: Example of Pyramidal
Structure
Source: Villalonga and Amit, 2009

What drives the existence of these
ownership structures, going beyond the
standard argument based on the search for
control in excess of ownership? One study
examines an environment with low investor
protection where a family owns a firm and is
about to set up another.45 In this situation,
the family has to choose the ownership
structure of the newly created business
group: either horizontal (the new firm is
owned directly by the family) or pyramidal
(the new firm is owned, in part, by an
upper-tier existing firm). With low investor
protection, the family is able to divert
cash flow among its entities. This makes
the pyramid more attractive as it creates
a financing advantage. If such financing
explanation is right, it seems probable that
a firm with low access to external financing
is more likely to be controlled through a
pyramidal structure.
There is convincing evidence for this
explanation from empirical analysis.
One study used a dataset of 28,635
firms across 45 countries to test the
financing explanation of pyramidal
structure formation, and found that at the
country level, external capital availability
is negatively associated with pyramid
formation.46 At the firm level, it found that
firms in pyramidal structures are more
investment-intensive, younger and riskier,
which makes it harder for them to raise
external capital.
Disproportionate board representation is
another control mechanism widely used
by family firms. This defines the situation
where families have the right to elect
board members in excess of both their
cash-flow rights and their voting rights.
Disproportionate board representation is
largely frequent in US family firms, being
present in 60% of the sample of one
study.47 Among firms where the fraction of
the board control exceeds ownership, the
average difference between board rights
and control rights is 10%, the study found.

Finally, family control may be related to
the price of family firms’ stock at IPO.
Issuing underpriced shares has the effect
of favouring oversubscription, meaning
that the demand exceeds the total number
of shares available. This allows the owner
to decide to which buyers to allocate the
shares and what amounts to allocate
them. The family may be willing to use
this strategy to ensure diffused external
shareholdings and avoid large blockholders.
This may be attractive to the family, since
one large external blockholder could
monitor the family’s activity, complicating
the potential appropriation of private
benefits. Based on such motivation, it has
been hypothesized that family involvement
in the firm is positively related to the degree
of IPO underpricing.48 A sample of IPOs
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange shows
that firms with strong family involvement
pursue more IPO underpricing than firms
with low family involvement.

3.3 Board of Directors
The board of directors is a central element
of the governance structure of any
firm, private or public. Its main role is to
monitor the management on behalf of the
shareholders and ensure that management
actions are in the shareholders’ best
interest. This includes both controlling
and advising the managers’ activities. In
the context of the family firm, the board is
expected to represent the interests of both
the family blockholders and the non-family
shareholders.
The board should make two contributions
to the firm:49
– Overseeing the managerial activity
(monitoring)
– Offering expertise, knowledge and
support to the management (resource
provision)
Two characteristics of the board are taken
into account: board dependence (the
degree to which the board is subordinated
to the management) and board capital (the
sum of directors’ human and social capital).
It is suggested that:
– Family power influences positively
the dependence of the board and
negatively the capital of the board.
– Board dependence is negatively related
to monitoring, and board capital is
positively associated with resource
provision.
– Therefore, family power impacts
negatively both functions of the board:
the more powerful the family in the firm,
the less helpful the board.
However, the negative relation between
family power and board performance
is moderated by two important factors:
family culture and family experience. When

these two forces are conducive, family
power has a less detrimental effect on the
board’s performance. Ultimately, this model
suggests that the board’s performance
depends on family characteristics, such
as family power, family culture and family
experience. Therefore, there is no unique
board structure that may be optimal for
all family firms; the board needs to be
structured based on the specific family
context.
While there is no single best structure of
a family firm’s board of directors, there
is broad support for the importance of
board independence, as the presence of
independent directors on the board reduces
the risk of appropriation of private benefits.
The importance of board independence
has stimulated a range of studies centred
on the relation of board independence to
firm-level and country-level characteristics.
One study of board independence in
relation to firm ownership concentration
and country legal environment, using data
on 229 firms from 14 European countries,
finds that when ownership concentration is
greater, boards are less independent. It also
finds that boards are more independent
where legal protection is greater. Therefore,
when firm ownership is concentrated or a
country’s legal environment is weak, the
board is unable to fully exercise its control
function, creating room for the family
blockholder to extract resources from
minority shareholders.

3.4 Executive Compensation
The founding family often has substantial
power in determining executive
compensation. This may be a complex
issue, particularly when the family firm is
led by a non-family CEO. In such a case,
the compensation scheme has to cope
with potential incentive conflicts and
time-horizon differences between the two
parties. Executive compensation typically
includes monetary and non-monetary
rewards. It includes salary, short-term
incentives (such as bonuses) and long-term
incentives (such as stock options).
The main question concerns what elements
drive the family decision-making process
when it comes to establishing executive
compensation. A sample of 253 US family
public corporations during 1995 -1998
shows the existence of a compensation
discount for family CEOs compared to
non-family CEOs: family members leading
the firm are paid less than their non-family
counterparts.50 This compensation gap
increases when the family ownership is
higher: family ownership concentration
decreases family CEO pay and increases
non-family CEO pay. Moreover, the
compensation discount decreases when
systemic risk is higher – high systemic risk
increases family CEO pay and decreases
non-family CEO pay. The combination of

these facts suggests that the family affects
family CEO compensation, not through
higher pay, but mostly through greater
risk protection. Finally, the presence of an
external institutional blockholder in the firm
decreases the long-term incentive for the
family CEO. This fact supports the view that
institutional investors may avoid long-term
incentives for the family CEO for reasons
related to risk: a higher long-term incentive
would exacerbate the CEO’s risk-aversion,
which in the family context is already
likely to be strong. This would lead to a
suboptimal risk profile and negatively affect
firm performance.
As discussed, the most relevant agency
problem in the family firm context is
the incentive conflict between family
blockholder and non-family shareholders.
CEO compensation is one of the
instruments the family may exploit to
extract private benefits. A study of the
relation between CEO ownership and
CEO compensation using a sample of 412
public corporations in Hong Kong during
the period 1995-1998 finds managerial
ownership of up to 35% to be positively
related to CEO compensation among small
firms.51 Among large firms, managerial
ownership of up to 10% is positively
related to CEO compensation. In general,
the lack of managerial ownership is
negatively related to CEO compensation.
These results provide evidence that the
owner-managers may use their position to
determine a higher personal salary. This
confirms the idea that family CEOs may
be using this channel to extract benefits
for themselves, at the expense of other
shareholders.
Families may also try to alleviate the
incentive conflict with non-family
shareholders – especially in situations
where such risk is higher. Also, certain
control-enhancing mechanisms put the
family in a position to extract private
benefits. One of these instruments is dualclass stock. An investigation of the relation
between dual-class stock and executive
compensation in a sample of Canadian
public companies between 1998 and 2006
finds evidence that family executives are
paid more in dual-class family firms than in
single-class family firms.52 However, most
of this compensation is incentive-based:
stock options and bonuses. This suggests
that the extra compensation in dual-class
firms may have the objective of aligning the
incentives of the owner-manager with those
of the minority shareholders. This is a way
to mitigate the possibility of private benefits
appropriation generated by the additional
control of dual-class stock.
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Finally, consider the case in which the
family chooses to hire a non-family CEO. In
this situation, a particularly complex issue
concerns how the family should pay the
non-family CEO: family and professional
managers typically differ in preferences, risk
profiles and time horizons. Drawing from
classical contract theory, the short-term
incentives to be offered to a non-family
CEO should be low in the following cases:
when the CEO is interested in signalling
performance of executives to the outside
market; when the CEO’s effort to improve
short-term performance is hard to observe;
when the CEO is considerably risk-averse;
and when the CEO is more sensitive to
incentives. Since family CEOs are less
motivated to signal their performance to the
executive market and are likely to manage
the firm in the long-term, they are less
responsive to short-term incentives. Thus,
the effect of short-term incentives is more
intense for non-family CEOs. This suggests
that the compensation schemes for family
managers should include higher short-term
incentives, in order to reinforce the family
CEO’s incentive to perform well in the short
term.

3.5 Dividend Policy
The family can use dividends to either
compensate for – or take advantage of – its
controlling position in the firm. Therefore,
dividend policy may alleviate or exacerbate
the conflict between family blockholder and
non-family shareholders.
The wedge between ownership and control
can be seen as a proxy for how much
the firm is subject to the risk of having a
controlling blockholder appropriate private
benefits of control, as discussed in Section
3.2. A study of the way firms use dividend
policy, using a sample of public companies
from Europe and East Asia, identifies some
interesting facts.53 First, firms pay higher
dividends when they are tightly affiliated
with a business group and when they have
a stronger wedge between ownership
and control. This suggests that affiliated
firms tend to use dividends to alleviate
the investors’ expectation of potential
appropriation of private benefits. In fact,
there is no evidence of this phenomenon
for loosely affiliated firms: in that case,
shareholders perceive a lower risk for
appropriation. Second, among corporations
affiliated with a business group and with
a positive wedge, European firms pay
higher dividends than East Asian firms. This
suggests that European investors are more
aware of the potential for expropriation,
inducing European firms to be more willing
to use such a compensation mechanism.
Since family firms are generally affiliated
with business groups, this study suggests
that families do use the dividend policy to
offset the effect of potential conflict with
minority shareholders. Moreover, the degree
to which this instrument is used depends
18
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on the degree of financial development of
the economy.
The literature examining the dividend
policy of family firms has reported mixed
evidence. Part of the literature suggests
that family firms pay lower dividends than
non-family firms. A study on a sample
of Spanish firms finds that family firms
pay around 40% lower dividends than
non-family firms and this difference is
statistically significant.54 This may increase
tension with other family shareholders
and decrease family firm attractiveness
to outside investors. However, another
part of the literature offers contradicting
evidence. A study of the dividend policy of
family firms using a sample of European
corporations finds that family firms pay
higher and more stable dividends than nonfamily firms.55 Moreover, family firms with a
non-family second blockholder pay higher
dividends than family firms without such
a second blockholder. Also, family firms
with no separation between ownership and
control pay higher dividends than families
where the wedge is positive. Overall, this
contribution supports the idea that family
firms pay higher dividends, suggesting an
attitude to compensate for the potential
agency problem.
The dividend decision has to be considered
in the broader context of the firm’s financial
management. In fact, a firm’s dividend
policy varies depending on other firms’
policies.56 In particular, the relation between
dividends and board independence is
negative among family firms and positive
among non-family firms. This shows that
there is a strong interdependence between
these two policies. Such interaction differs
between family firms and non-family firms.
Family firms use these two governance
mechanisms as substitutes: when the
board is not independent, the firm pays
higher dividends to compensate for that,
and vice versa. In contrast, non-family
firms use these two governance tools as
complementary.
Thus, there is evidence for the idea that
families use dividends to alleviate the
agency problem with minority shareholders,
which is perceived to be more salient when
the board is not independent.

3.6 Succession
The succession decision is a crucial step
for the family firm. This process concerns
whether and how to transfer the family
firm’s ownership, control and management
to the next generation. There is substantial
evidence to show that families often prefer
to transfer their business to their offspring.
It is often assumed that such behaviour is
simply the manifestation of some form of
nepotism. However, the literature suggests
there is much more involved.

One common argument posits that the
major determinant of the succession
outcome is the legal environment where
the family firm is located.57 Considering
the standard typology of a founding family
firm – one that is owned and managed
by its founder – when the transition is
approaching, the founder has to make
a decision regarding ownership, control
and management of the firm. In particular,
the founder can choose the next CEO
from potential family heirs or appoint a
professional, who is assumed to be a better
manager.
This decision depends on the extent that
the law protects minority shareholders:58
– In a strong legal protection environment,
the founder would hire the professional
as CEO and sell the firm in the stock
market.
– In a weak legal protection environment,
the founder would choose the family
heir as CEO and keep the firm
ownership.
– In an intermediate legal protection
environment, the founder would hire
the professional as CEO but keep a
controlling stake in the firm.
This last case, perhaps the most common
in many Western countries, is a situation
that involves two agency problems:
the conflict between management and
shareholders and the conflict between
family blockholders and non-family
shareholders.
An alternative argument suggests that
the choice of transferring the family
firm to a family heir may be motivated
by an economic rationale that centres
on the specificity of the family firm’s
assets. Typically, the family firm’s most
crucial assets – its human and social
capital – are rather individual-specific and
idiosyncratic. Consider a founder having
to choose the next CEO between the
family heir and an outsider. The founder
can hire the professional for one period
and then re-evaluate that decision. The
main consideration in this decision is the
so-called appropriation of risk: should the
skilled manager be hired for one period
or for a longer period? The issue here
is that once the manager acquires the
idiosyncratic knowledge, they may use that
knowledge to bargain for a higher level of
compensation from the founder. Hence,
the founder is trapped in a dilemma: hiring
a skilled professional manager, both firm
profitability and appropriation risk would
increase, making it unclear whether or not
this would be the best choice to make.59
This dilemma may motivate the founder
to transfer the firm leadership to a family
heir who may be less skilled at managing
the firm, in particular when performance
depends on idiosyncratic knowledge. In
fact, in such a case, the founder would
perceive a very high appropriation risk and

be willing to trade it off with the initial lower
profitability caused by the lower ability of
the family heir. This dynamic explains why
families often choose their heirs to lead
their firms, without relying on the usual
nepotism argument. Therefore, this study
suggests that founders should carefully
take into account the appropriation risk,
since family firms are known to depend
profoundly on idiosyncratic knowledge.
Finally, in the extreme case where the heir
is poorly qualified, the authors suggest
that the family should undertake what is
known as the seat-warmer strategy: hiring
a professional temporarily, even if having
to pay a premium in compensating the
professional, until a suitable heir is available
to lead the firm.
In addition to addressing what motivates
families to retain control of the business
across generations, there is need to
question the best way to do so. Using a
case-study approach to identify the features
characterizing the successful transfer of
the family business to the offspring, five
ways have been identified through which
successful transitions have taken place:60
– The heir voluntarily took the lead of the
family firm
– The family explicitly requested the heir
to succeed to the helm of the firm
– The heir chose to take the lead out of a
sense of moral duty
– The transfer was implicitly
predetermined and there was no need
to make any explicit request
– The family softly pushed the heir to take
control of the firm

One study classifies the drivers of effective
family succession into three categories:62
the preparation of the heir; the nature of
the relationships among family members;
and the planning and control activity in the
family firm. Based on econometric analysis
of survey data, it finds that the transition
occurs more smoothly when heirs are more
accurately prepared, when the firm does
considerable planning activity, and when
family relationships are based on trust and
affability. Among these three elements, the
main driving force is the nature of family
relationships. Therefore, this study suggests
that families should strive to develop and
maintain relationships based on trust
and affability among members; not only
will such effort be beneficial in the short
run, it will also be critical at the moment
of passing the business on to the next
generation.

Six steps that can be taken to better
prepare for the transition are summarized in
Figure 9.61

Figure 9: Six Steps to Prepare for a Successful Succession
Source: Adapted from Lambrecht, 2005

1. Involve the heir in the business very early
2. Have the heir undertake studies related to the business
3. Provide the heir with internal education tailored to initiate her into an
understanding of the business
4. Encourage the heir to gain work experience in other companies
5. Officially introduce the heir into the business
6. Regulate the debut of the heir into the family business by a written
agreement
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4. Governance of Other
Family Entities
Multi-generation, multi-branch family
enterprises often establish a family office
and a family foundation. These two entities
play a vitally important role in family life
and therefore require the development of
appropriate governance structures. Since
governance issues associated with these
entities have only been sparsely studied, a
short review is provided below.

Families with substantial
investable assets in
excess of US$ 100 million
often choose to set up
their own family office - a
professional organization
dedicated to serving the
financial and personal
needs of the family.
4.1 Family Office
As the family grows in size and complexity,
and its business flourishes, family members
increasingly face the need for wealth
management, broadly defined. Substantial
families with investable assets in excess of
US$ 100 million often choose to set up their
own family office, which is a professional
organization dedicated to serving the
financial and personal needs of the family.
While family offices vary in size and scope,
their mandate includes managing the
liquid wealth of family members (i.e. those
financial assets that are not tied to the
family-controlled operating company),
serving as the administrative backbone of
the family enterprise and providing a range
of services to the family.
Specifically, the services offered by a family
office fall into three broad categories:
– Investment management services,
including asset allocation, manager
selection, manager monitoring and
performance measurement.
– Administrative services, including
technology support, financial
information aggregation, financial
record-keeping, compliance,
accounting and banking.
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–

Family-related services, including estate
planning to manage tax-efficient intergenerational wealth transfer, education
programmes for younger family
members, risk management, insurance,
concierge services and security.

Some of these services are provided
in-house by professionals who are
hired by the family office under various
specializations such as investment, finance,
accounting and legal, while other services
are outsourced to external vendors. It is
common for a family member to lead the
family office.
There are potential vulnerabilities in the
family office and sources of risk for the
family therein.63 Family offices are subject
to three types of risk: financial (such as
cash misappropriation and inaccurate
book-keeping), technology-related (such as
information theft and technical problems in
the system) and employment-related (such
as payroll fraud and tax issues). Therefore,
an effective set of internal controls must
be incorporated into the family office
governance – internal processes designed
to identify and mitigate these risks, allowing
the family office to achieve its objectives.

The most effective internal controls fall into
five main classes:
1. Governance practices reflecting the
family standards with respect to ethics
2. Procedures regulating and limiting
access to family funds
3. Practices supporting the segregation of
duties
4. Processes for conducting frequent
reconciliations
5. Practices of documenting all significant
transactions
A recent benchmarking study of family
offices provides insights on the drivers of
family office performance, based on survey
data from a sample of 106 single family
offices (SFOs) located in 24 countries.64 The
majority of families in this sample operate
a family business in addition to managing
their wealth through the SFO. American
family offices seem to be more versatile
than their European counterparts: the
former emphasize non-financial services
(administrative and family-related) more
than the latter. What emerges from the
benchmarking study overall is that highperforming SFOs share several best
practices, as listed in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Best Practices of Single-Family Offices
Source: Amit and Liechtenstein, 2012

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Expanded capabilities to handle key activities in-house
Significant number of family members involved
Superior governance and control structure
Detailed documentation of every activity within the family office
Codified investment-management processes
Extensive and frequent communication with family members
State-of-the-art human capital processes and compensation practices
Education programmes for younger generations
Succession planning

A study examining Swiss family offices
highlights the important roles of family office
boards, which are a central element of the
governance structure of family offices.65 The
board should be responsible for setting the
overall direction of the family office as well
as monitoring its activities. The composition
of the family office board should reflect
diverse skills and backgrounds. There
should be clearly defined roles for its
members, who should be integrated
into the activities of the family office as
well as of the family members and other
stakeholders. The functioning of the family
office and the performance of its board
depend on a culture of trust, which has a
major role in minimizing conflict, enabling
conflict resolution and allowing a smooth
monitoring process.

4.2 Family Foundation
The family foundation is the entity through
which the family enterprise carries out its
philanthropic activities in a tax-efficient
manner. Typically, the family foundation is
a private foundation, which is supported
by the family, the family business and its
investment income. Its main activity is
providing grants according to its mission.
Although foundations play a crucial role in
many developed countries, the study of
family foundations is still at its early stages
and the literature has not yet produced as
many insights on this subject as on other
aspects of the family enterprise.

The family foundation
can be very beneficial
for the family for reasons
beyond tax reduction and
reputation.
The family foundation can be very beneficial
for the family for reasons beyond tax
reduction and reputation. Mainly, the family
foundation can have three positive effects
on family dynamics by:66
– providing financial education
– enhancing family communication
– enabling a larger family discussion
The family foundation offers an excellent
opportunity for family members to learn
about financial and investment issues,
serving as a platform for the older
generation to mentor the new generation
on issues such as due diligence, valuation
and investment strategy. Moreover, family
foundations provide additional occasions
for the family to meet, thereby enhancing
communication among family members.
Finally, family foundations have the effect of
enlarging the discussion within the family,
putting emphasis on issues that would
otherwise remain understated.

To maintain its tax exemption, the family
foundation needs to distribute about 5%
of its market value for charitable purposes
each year. A key governance decision for
family foundations is how to carry out their
grant-making activity – give it directly to
the receiving subject or indirectly through
another organization. Family foundations
typically prefer to fund charitable activities
indirectly by funding other charitable
organizations.
The main governance institution of family
foundations is usually a governing board.
Typically, numerous family members
serve on the board, including the
founding donor.67 The board can also
include non-family members, particularly
representatives from the community. The
board meets at various times every year
to review the foundation’s activities and
direction, particularly grant proposals and
investment performance. The majority of
family foundation board members are often
volunteers, so they typically receive only
an expense reimbursement. Four main
foundation structure models – trustee,
administrator, director and presidential – are
described in Figure 11.68
A key governance decision for the family
foundation – similar to the family firm
– concerns hiring outsiders. As family
foundations grow, family members may
no longer be willing or suitable to lead the
family foundation, so families tend to hire
outside administrators. The non-family
administrator is likely to lead the foundation
to a new stage of its existence, changing
its previous processes and dynamics. As
such, the non-family administrator may offer
three important contributions:69
1. Bringing in a new level of professional
management
2. Enhancing the relationship between the
foundation and the community
3. Bringing a fresh and objective
perspective into the family

Since the foundation is often a small entity,
the relationship between the family and
the administrator is key to the foundation’s
performance. A close relationship is
desirable, but if it becomes too close,
there is a possibility that the administrator
becomes subordinate to the family and
fails to bring objectivity and expertise to the
foundation’s decisions. This will obviously
harm the foundation’s performance.
Finally, family foundations have to make the
choice between diversification and focus in
their grant-making strategy. Diversification
in grant-making may require professional
skills only available outside. This may not
be accepted by family members and may
create conflict within the family.
A study of the drivers of this decisionmaking process using a sample of the 200
largest independent foundations in the US
finds a number of interesting results:70
– Family foundations are significantly less
diversified than non-family foundations.
– The board size is positively related to
diversification.
– Later generation foundations are more
diversified.
– Family foundations with lower family
control on their boards are more
diversified.
The combination of these facts confirms
that the family presence tends to be
an obstacle towards grant-making
diversification.
Family foundations play an increasingly
important and visible role in both traditional
areas of philanthropy and innovative
research and development (R&D) initiatives.
It is hoped that future research on family
foundations will yield new insights on
this important component of the family
enterprise.

Figure 11: Four Models of Family Foundation Structure
Source: Adapted from Brody and Strauch, 1990

– Trustee model: There is no additional staff and the board also
performs daily administration
– Administrator model: A small staff is hired to perform daily
administration, while the board makes decisions
– Director model: An executive director guides the board activity
– Presidential model: The board sets policies and monitors progress,
while an administrator has wide authority
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5. Governance and
Performance
The relation between the governance
architecture of the family enterprise and
economic performance is important
to understand how each aspect of the
governance system may differentially
impact the performance of a family entity.
By reviewing the relation between each
governance element and performance, an
attempt is made to infer best practices to
be shared with family enterprises.

Researchers find strong
evidence that the use
of family governance
practices enhances the
financial success of the
firm.
5.1 Family and Performance
While common wisdom suggests that the
family affects performance only through
the role it plays in its business, empirical
evidence suggests that family composition
and size per se have a profound effect
on performance. A study of the effect of
family structure on family firm performance
using data from 93 Thai family business
groups finds a significantly negative relation
between the number of sons and firm
performance.71 This relation is mitigated
to some extent during the lifetime of the
founder, and appears stronger in those
firms where the founder has passed away.
The number of daughters also has a
negative effect on performance, although
this is weaker. Hence, family size seems to
adversely affect performance, suggesting
that family size may provide incentives to
extract resources from the firm, thereby
generating conflict.
Family processes also affect performance.
Using survey data on US firms, an analysis
of how family relations and processes
impact performance, as measured by firm
revenues, shows that family tension has a
strong negative impact on performance.72
The data also suggests that there is a
positive relation between family members
working in the company and performance.
Considering the effect of the so-called
disruptive variables, the study finds that
shifting time from the family to the business
22
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is positively related to performance.
Conversely, using family money for the
firm, or skipping a business task in order
to spend time with the family, and having
occasional free labour from family members
in the business, are all negatively related to
performance.
Family governance can mitigate family
tension, as discussed in Section 2.
Therefore, family governance mechanisms
should have a relevant effect on
performance, given the link between
family tension and performance. A study
of six family governance practices – family
constitution, family code of conduct,
clear selection and accountability criteria,
family councils, family reunions and family
communication tools – to examine their
effect on family firm performance shows
that family governance reinforces family
ties, building a unified team with common
preferences and goals.73 A unified team is
likely to lead to enhanced performance.
Based on survey data on 94 family firms
from 18 countries around the world, the
study finds strong evidence that the use of
family governance practices enhances the
financial success of the firm.
The succession decision is a key dilemma
in the family enterprise. Much evidence
suggests that families tend to prefer to
keep control of the firm across generations.
Stewardship theory further suggests that
the intention to keep the business within
the family may have a positive effect on
performance.75 Families intending to pass
their business on to the next generation will:
− have a more forward-looking approach
in their business decisions
− make an effort to build reputation and
social capital
− invest in business education and
apprenticeship of family members, and
develop a strong organizational culture
− build a strong relationship with the
professional managers, so that they will
support a new family member who will
eventually lead the enterprise
This combination of practices – driven by
the intention of keeping the business within
the family – will have a positive effect on
long-term performance.

5.2 Family Ownership and
Performance
The common perception is that family
ownership is not a value-maximizing
ownership structure. However, an analysis
of the relation between family ownership
and family firm performance using a sample
of 403 US family firms between 1992 and
1999 finds that family firms outperform
non-family firms in both accounting and
market measures of performance.76 It finds
that the relation between family ownership
and performance is similar to an inverseU-shape: it increases as family ownership
increases, but decreases after a certain
point.
An empirical examination of all Fortune 500
firms between 1994 and 2000, looking
at the impact on performance of family
ownership, management and control,
establishes that family ownership per se
creates value for the firm.77
A large body of literature has studied a
separate but related problem: the effect
of insider ownership – the ownership of
the firm by managers or board members
– on performance. An analysis of data on
US firms during the period 1994-1999 to
investigate how insider ownership affects
firm value supports the idea of an inverseU-shaped relation: insider ownership
increases performance at moderate levels,
but decreases it at excessive levels.78
This evidence of the positive effect of family
ownership on performance is confirmed
by a number of studies focusing on
different regions of the world. Canadian
family firms’ performance is not worse in
market terms, and is better in accounting
terms, than that of non-family firms.79 A
sample of 675 public companies from
11 European countries finds that family
ownership positively affects performance.80
An examination of 1,672 firms from 13
European countries finds that family
ownership is associated with a 7% higher
valuation and 16% higher profitability.81
Finally, a study of data from 1,301 public
companies from eight East Asian countries
also finds family ownership positively related
to value.82
Corporate transparency refers to the
degree to which shareholders have easy
access to all information regarding the firm
and is an important monitoring device. In
family firms, family members might be in a
position to effectively determine the level

of corporate transparency. They could
have the incentive to diminish it, in order to
extract private benefits from the firm more
easily. Alternatively, transparency could just
be diminished because it would become
less useful when family members would
directly serve the function of monitoring
the management. Opacity plays a key
role in determining the performance of
family-owned firms – family firms are
significantly more opaque than widely-held
corporations, as a study using a sample
of 2,000 US public companies shows.83
Most importantly, opacity plays a key role
in the relation between family ownership
and performance. In fact, family ownership
affects performance positively only among
firms with low levels of opacity. As opacity
increases, family ownership decreases
performance. This evidence suggests
that the positive relation between family
ownership and family firm performance
is conditional on the family firm being
transparent. If the firm is not transparent,
the market perceives that the family may be
extracting resources from the firm.
Finally, the literature has highlighted the role
of the environment in the relation between
family ownership and performance. The
environment may affect firms mainly
through two channels: the cultural
channel and the institutional channel. The
first domain includes values and norms
traditionally embedded in the behaviour of
individuals. The second domain concerns
characteristics of market development
and the legal framework. Therefore,
environmental characteristics may bias our
results about the relation between family
ownership and family firm performance. A
sample of Chinese firms – chosen because
China is seen as an appropriate location
characterized by cultural homogeneity and
institutional heterogeneity across provinces,
allowing for isolation of the institutional
effect from the cultural effect – confirms
that family ownership is positively related
to performance.84 However, this relation is
only strong in regions with low institutional
efficiency. This finding suggests that family
ownership is the optimal structure when it
can stand in for the underdevelopment of
the market.

5.3 Family Control and
Performance
Family firms tend to achieve control rights
beyond their ownership rights. Through
the use of control-enhancing mechanisms,
they manage to achieve this wedge,
which gives them additional decisionmaking power over a broad range of
corporate matters. This may allow them
to make additional contributions in terms
of motivation, expertise and social capital.
But this may also give them the possibility
to extract resources from the firm. When
the latter effect is more significant than
the former, the situation is detrimental to

minority shareholders. A range of empirical
studies using data from numerous countries
suggests that the wedge between voting
rights and cash-flow rights adversely affects
performance.
A study of a sample of US firms finds
that, in general, the use of controlenhancing mechanisms is negatively
related to performance.85 The resulting
wedge between control and ownership
decreases value proportionally: the higher
the difference between voting rights and
cash-flow rights, the higher the reduction
in value. A further investigation of this
issue, by analyzing a sample of US public
companies between 1994 and 2000,
finds that the impact of control-enhancing
mechanisms on performance depends
on the specific mechanism used.86 There
is evidence that dual-class stock and
disproportionate board representation are
negatively related to value. Conversely,
there is no evidence of such negative
relation when families use pyramidal
structures or voting agreements, which
may rather have a positive effect on
value. The finding about dual-class stock
is confirmed by another study, which
analyses a comprehensive list of US dualclass firms between 1995 and 2002.87 This
evidence suggests that family firms should
carefully consider which mechanisms to
use to control their firms, as their effects on
performance are different.
The evidence of a negative effect on
performance of a separation between
ownership and control is confirmed by data
from around the world. Using a sample of
675 public companies from 11 European
countries, a study finds that the existence
of a wedge between control and ownership
adversely affects family firm performance.88
A study examining the same question from
data on 1,301 public companies from eight
East Asian countries confirms that, in this
region of the world too, a positive wedge
between control and ownership decreases
the value of the firm.89 Interestingly, it
highlights that this negative effect is strongly
significant only for family firms, but less
relevant for state-controlled and widelyheld firms. Family firms are perceived to be
particularly prone to take advantage of their
control position to extract resources from
their firms.
The literature has also addressed the
separation between ownership and control
in the context of insider ownership – the
situation where managers or board
members have an ownership stake in
the company. This context is applicable
to family firms, since typically families
are actively involved in the business. An
investigation of the effect on performance
of the difference between control and
ownership of the management group,
using a sample of 1,433 firms from 18
emerging markets, finds that whenever
the management group has control rights
exceeding ownership rights, firm value

decreases.90 Moreover, a look at the same
question using data on 800 firms from eight
East Asian countries during the 1997 Asian
financial crisis finds that during the crisis,
stock returns declined significantly more
for firms with strong separation between
management control rights and ownership
rights than for other firms.91 This evidence
is consistent with the negative effect of the
wedge between ownership and control on
performance.
Family firms are typically characterized by
a concentration of control in the hands of
a unique shareholder group, the family.
The literature has highlighted that the
distribution of control rights has an effect
on firm performance. Among Finnish public
companies, between 1993 and 2000,
there is evidence that family firms with a
more equal distribution of voting power
among blockholders performed better.92
Therefore, the presence of at least another
blockholder with substantial control,
besides the family, increases the value of
the family firm. This result is conceptually
consistent with a theoretical argument that,
in closely-held corporations, the optimal
ownership structure has either one large
shareholder or multiple shareholders of
similar size.93
An important instrument through which
the family maintains control of the firm is
the board of directors. The composition
of the board of directors has a relevant
effect on the performance of the family
firm. Among the 500 Standard & Poor’s
firms during the period 1992-1999, family
involvement on the board was nonlinearly related to performance: family
involvement at moderate levels was helpful;
at excessive levels, it was detrimental.94
This suggests that, at moderate levels,
the presence of the family on the board
may provide benefits to the firm. However,
if the family has too much power in the
board, it is likely to extract resources
from the firm, hindering performance. The
family role in the board can be regulated
by the presence of outside directors.
Typically, outside directors are of two
types: independent (directors having no
other connection with the firm) and affiliate
(directors having some business tie with
the firm). The key finding of this study is the
expected positive relation between board
independence and performance: the more
independent the board is, the better the
firm performs. Conversely, the presence of
affiliated directors is negatively related to
performance. This evidence suggests that
only independent directors are able to play
a moderating role in the board.
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5.4 Family Management and
Performance
Family management occurs when either the
founder or a descendant manages the firm.
This latter case is very common. There is
wide evidence suggesting that family firms
often prefer to have the heir managing the
family business, instead of an outsider,
as discussed in Section 3. However, it is
important to ask how this impacts family
firm performance.
The literature has offered contradictory
evidence of the effect of family
management on performance. Some
studies have identified a positive effect.
In the US, family-managed firms have
been found to be more valuable and more
efficient,95 while Norwegian firms that are
family-managed are seen to be significantly
less productive than non-family firms.96
More recent literature has investigated
the issue at a deeper level, clarifying
that the result depends on the type of
family management. Among US firms,
having the founder as CEO is positively
related to performance, while having the
descendant as CEO is negatively related
to performance.97 In other words, family
firms perform well when they are led by
the founder but not when they are led
by a descendant. Further, the presence
of an outside CEO is beneficial for the
family firm, as long as the founder acts
as a chairperson, confirming the crucial
importance of the contribution of the
founder’s skills and expertise to the family
firm. This result is consistent with the
findings from a study of 896 US public
companies that the outperformance of
family firms is entirely attributable to lone
founder firms.98 Therefore, there seems
to be evidence of a positive founder-CEO
effect and a negative descendant-CEO
effect.
A vast body of literature has investigated
the positive founder-CEO effect on family
firm performance. A significant founderCEO effect on firm performance is visible
among US public companies.99 A positive
relation between having the founder as
CEO and long-run investment performance
is also found among US companies, but
mostly in high-technology industries.100
A sample of 2,327 US public companies
between 1992 and 2002 confirms the
positive performance of these firms, by
showing that a hypothetical investment
strategy to buy founder-CEO firms would
have significantly outperformed the market
by more than 10% annually.101 Moreover,
a strong difference in behaviour is in
evidence between founder-CEO firms
and descendant-CEO firms. In particular,
founder-CEO firms invest more in R&D,
have higher capital expenditures and make
more focused merger and acquisition (M&A)
decisions.
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The key finding seems to be the negative
effect of the descendant CEO on family
firm performance. This problem is related
to family succession decisions and has
been widely studied. A sample of 335
CEO transitions in firms with concentrated
ownership shows that any transition
involving a family relation – where there
is a family tie between the new CEO and
the previous CEO, the founder or the
blockholder – has a negative impact on
performance.102 Firms appointing CEOs
based on family ties perform 14% worse
in accounting terms and 16% worse
in market terms during the three years
following the transition. The findings
suggest that family firms may be making
succession decisions based on reasons
other than merit. In testing this hypothesis
by investigating the effect of education on
family CEO performance, the study finds
that firms where the family CEO did not
attend a selective undergraduate institution
significantly underperform firms appointing
a non-family CEO, while this effect is not
observed in firms where the family CEO
attended a selective college.
An investigation of family CEO performance
impact using a sample of 5,334 CEO
successions in Danish firms between 1994
and 2002 confirms that appointing a family
CEO implies a significant 4% decrease
in accounting-based performance.103
Moreover, this underperformance is
particularly evident in large firms, fastgrowing industries and skilled-labour
industries. An analysis of the quality of
management practices on a sample of 732
medium-sized manufacturing firms from
the US, the United Kingdom, France and
Germany, involving an innovative survey
technique, finds that family firms choosing
the CEO based on primogeniture are very
poorly managed.104 Having a first-born
descendant as CEO has a significantly
negative effect on management quality,
which is shown to be positively related to
various measures of performance such as
firm productivity and firm value.

6. Key Insights
The academic and professional literature on
the governance of the family enterprise has
produced a number of important findings. It
offers an important resource for families, as
well as for practitioners working closely with
family enterprises.

The family is the
cornerstone on which the
related entities are based.
Therefore, its successful
governance is crucial to
the survival of the entire
family enterprise.
The family enterprise is a complex and
distinctive organization, in that it pursues
multiple objectives: maintaining unity
and harmony within the family; achieving
prosperity of the family firm; keeping
control of the business across generations;
mitigating family conflict; preserving its liquid
assets and so on. The survival and success
of the family enterprise, which encompasses
the family, the family-controlled operating
company or companies, one or more
foundations, and often a family office,
requires a coherent and interdependent
governance system to enable the realization
of the family’s multiple objectives.
Family governance refers to the rules,
processes and institutions which enable
the decision-making and implementation
of policies concerning the oversight and
management of family affairs. It includes
informal elements, such as values and
norms shared among the family members,
as well as formal elements, such as the
family constitution, family council and
family committees. Informal elements play
a primary role: without a common ground
of shared values, beliefs and norms, no
formal structure can successfully operate.
The family is the cornerstone on which
the related entities are based. Therefore,
its successful governance is crucial to the
survival of the entire family enterprise.
The literature points to fairness perception
as the core informal element in family
governance. Fairness perception leads to
higher satisfaction with family decisions
and stronger identification with the family,
while alleviating family conflict. Enabling
a climate of fairness, a collaborative
approach to resolving conflict and frequent
communication has been shown to enhance
family harmony and the effectiveness of
management in the family business.105
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These “soft” aspects of family governance
are particularly important in the multibranch, multi-generational family. Hence,
close attention must be paid to these
aspects during the process of developing
family governance policies and institutions.
The family firm is the primary source
of wealth for the family. Governance
of the family firm must be designed to
carefully address the potential conflict of
interest between family and non-family
shareholders through the ownership
structure, the composition of the board
of directors, the compensation schemes
and the management of the family firm. By
proactively addressing these issues in the
design of family business governance, family
firm owners can alleviate the adverse effect
on value that may arise.
Families frequently use control-enhancing
mechanisms, that is, instruments that allow
them to have voting rights in excess of
cash-flow rights. These instruments include
dual-class stock, pyramidal structures,
cross-holdings and voting agreements.
The resulting wedge between voting rights
and ownership rights gives the family the
possibility of exercising majority control
on the firm. The existence of a large
wedge could be perceived by non-family
shareholders as an attempt by the family to
extract private benefits and thereby depress
firm value. Elements of the governance
structure of the family firm, such as the
composition of the board of directors and
the design of executive compensation and
dividend policy, are useful in mitigating the
potential adverse effects on value that arise
from the wedge.
The succession decision is a major
challenge for the family: how to transfer
ownership, control and management to
the next generation. The literature has
shown that failure to carefully manage all
aspects of this transition may lead to lower
firm performance, ultimately threatening
the survival of the family enterprise. There
is substantial evidence that families tend
to keep control of their business across
generations. The main rationale behind
this behaviour is simply that families have
multiple concurrent objectives: they seek
family harmony and unity while pursuing
financial wealth. The research has given
additional, complementary explanations for
this phenomenon – that succession occurs
internally when the legal environment is
weak,106 or that the business is kept within
the family due to the high specificity of the
family firm’s assets.107 The main takeaway is
that families should approach the transition
decision carefully and wisely. If the choice
is to transfer the family business to the heir,

the key message is that such transition
requires wide preparation and detailed
planning.108
Wealthy families often choose to create
a family office dedicated to serving the
financial and personal needs of family
members. While family offices vary in
size and scope, their mandate includes
managing the liquid wealth of family
members (i.e. those financial assets that are
not tied to the family-controlled operating
company); serving as the administrative
backbone of the family enterprise to
facilitate family life; and providing a range
of family services including estate planning,
which encompasses, among other
matters, tax-efficient wealth transfer to
future generations. The governance and
management of the family office needs to
be structured with a mix of family members
and professionals so as to enable smooth
functioning of the family office while ensuring
sufficient controls to mitigate the exposure
faced by the family.
Family enterprises typically carry out their
philanthropic activities through foundations.
The family foundation’s main activity
consists of providing grants to recipients
in a tax-efficient manner. The benefits of
the family foundation can extend beyond
tax savings and reputation. In fact, the
establishment of such an entity has major
positive effects on the family dynamics:
it provides financial education to family
members, strengthens communication
and facilitates discussion.109 The family
foundation requires its own effective
governance structure. In particular, an
important aspect concerns whether to
designate a family member or an outsider
as administrator. The literature suggests
that the choice of an outside professional
administrator has multiple advantages
including professional management, better
relationship between the foundation and
the community, and infusion of a fresh
perspective into the family.110
The key question is how the governance
elements of the family enterprise affect
the wealth, unity and happiness of the
family. The clear message that emerges
from the literature is that a codified family
enterprise governance system – one which
has been developed through a process
of elaborate consultations and dialogue
among family members, and which reflects
the family structure and dynamics as well
as the various incentives-related issues that
characterize a family firm – contributes to
enhancing family harmony and happiness
as well as family wealth.
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